Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm performance in China: the impact of compensation committee by Zhu, Yuqing et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2009 
Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm performance in 
China: the impact of compensation committee 
Yuqing Zhu 
University of Wollongong, lzhu@uow.edu.au 
Gary G. Tian 
University of Wollongong, gtian@uow.edu.au 
Shiguang Ma 
University of Wollongong, shiguang@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhu, Yuqing; Tian, Gary G.; and Ma, Shiguang: Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm 
performance in China: the impact of compensation committee 2009, 1-48. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2458 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm performance in China: 
the impact of compensation committee 
Abstract 
The independent directors of a board can impact CEO payperformancemore effectively if a compensation 
committeeprovides information and assist them in designing relevantexecutive pay schemes. On the 
basis of this idea, we developed andtested the hypotheses that Chinese firms with a 
compensationcommittee have a closer CEO pay link with performance when alarger proportion of 
independent directors serves on the board. Wefocused primarily on the effect of a compensation 
committee onCEO pay-performance relation as a consequence of its help for theboard and found that 
board independence produces a strongerrelationship between executive compensation and 
firmperformance in Chinese listed firms. This association is more evidentin those firms which have a 
compensation committee. Our findingssuggest that the interaction between independent directors on 
theboard and a compensation committee has important consequencesfor CEO incentive systems as well 
as corporate governancestructures in China. 
Keywords 
Executive, compensation, board, characteristics, firm, performance, China, impact, compensation, 
committee 
Disciplines 
Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Zhu, Y., Tian, G. Gang. & Ma, S. (2009). Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm 
performance in China: the impact of compensation committee. 22nd Australasian Finance and Banking 
Conference (pp. 1-48). Sydney, Australia: Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2458 
Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm 
performance in China: the impact of compensation committee 
 
Yuqing Zhu, Gary Gang Tian1 and Shiguan Ma 
School of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong 
 
Abstract 
The independent directors of a board can impact CEO pay-performance more effectively 
if a compensation committee provides information and assist them in designing relevant 
executive pay schemes. On the basis of this idea, we developed and tested the hypotheses 
that Chinese firms with a compensation committee have a closer CEO pay link with 
performance when a larger proportion of independent directors serves on the board. We 
focused primarily on the effect of a compensation committee on CEO pay-performance 
relation as a consequence of its help for the board and found that board independence 
produces a stronger relationship between executive compensation and firm performance 
in Chinese listed firms. This association is more evident in those firms which have a 
compensation committee. Our findings suggest that the interaction between independent 
directors on the board and a compensation committee has important consequences for 
CEO incentive systems as well as corporate governance structures in China. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent scandals related with executive compensation have attracted public attendance 
on the debate about restricting executive compensation and reforming the associated 
governance structure. Executive compensation plays a key role in corporate governance 
structure by providing motivations for executives to perform their duties to the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Andersen and Bizjak, 2003). For most firms, the 
specific design of executive compensation is delegated to a sub-committee of the board 
of directors: the compensation committee (CC). The board of directors get to approve the 
final executive pay schemes and thus the boards and their compensation committee both 
play an important role in linking executive pay to firm performance, and as well aligning 
the interests of managers with shareholders (Sun and Cahan, 2009).  
Similar to its Western counterparts, the board of directors in Chinese listed firms 
delegates the rights regarding executive compensation to its compensation committee. 
Therefore, the board characteristics and compensation committee qualities play an 
important role in determining executive compesantion. Recently the code of corporate 
governance implemented in 2003 for listed firms in China stipulates that executive 
compensation should reflect firm performance, accordingly enhancing pay-for-
performance relation and emphasizing the role of executive compensation governance 
mechanisms in Chinese listed firms from the standard setters’ viewpoint. Though 
corporate governance in Chinese listed firms have been improved since then,. there are 
still three fundamental issues regarding corporate governance in China: the expropriation 
of large shareholders, the neglect of duties by directors, and insider control. Thus, the 
monitoring role of the board and the executive compensation, whether or not it is set by 
the compensation committee, to a large extent will affect corporate governance in 
Chinese firms and hence mitigate relative agency issues. Not like their existing Western 
counterparts with long history, the compensation committee was only recommended by 
the Corporate Code 2001 by CSRC in China. Until now, the formation of compensation 
committee is still not a requirement for publically listed firms, making China a good 
example to investigate the voluntary formation of compensation committee in recent 
years as well as its effect on CEO pay-performance relation. 
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Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, the empirical 
evidence to date on certain governance structures to motivate managers to increase firm 
performance is mixed and gives little coherent support for the shape of an optimal 
governance structure. For example, the results of board independence on setting optimal 
executive compensation are inconclusive by using either Western data or Chinese data. 
Even there are considerable studies on executive compensation in US firms2, systematic 
research is only a few outside of the US as a result of limited data availability. Therefore, 
our study fills the void by providing evidence on board of directors, compensation 
committee, and executive pay-performance relation in Chinese listed firms. Secondly, the 
compensation committee composition data, for example, the proportion of independent 
directors on the committee, is not provided by any database in China when there is no 
any mandatory requirements for listed firms to disclose these information. We hand-
collected the data on compensation committee composition from voluntary disclose in the 
annual report and for the first time investigated the relation of compensation committee 
independence and executive pay-performance. Thirdly, prior evidence on board 
independence and executive pay-performance is mixed (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; 
Dahya and McConnell, 2005). Our study focuses on the role of compensation committee 
and suggests a stronger relation between board independence and executive pay-
performance when the compensation committee presents, partially contributing to an 
alternative explanation for the mixed results. 
Our results indicate that board independence produces a stronger relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese listed firms. This association is 
driven by those firms which have a compensation committee (β=13.39 and .β=1.58 for 
firms with a compensation committee and firms without a compensation committee, 
respectively). Moreover, the positive relation between board independence and executive 
pay-performance link is more evident in well performing firms and in firms with very 
large or very small board. For example, the estimates on coefficients of the interaction 
term (performance*board independence) are significantly positive for both sub-samples 
(p=0.03 for small boards and p=0.01 for large boards). Further tests show that 
                                                            
2 See, for example, Murphy (1999) reviews empirical studies on executive compensation when Gibbons 
(1997) reviews the pertinent theoretical literature. 
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independent directors on board work more effectively in setting right executive pay in the 
time periods after (β=5.33, p=0.01) than before the formation of a compensation 
committee (β=1.52, p=0.3). On the other hand, no significant relation was found 
between the proportion of independent directors on a compensation committee and 
executive pay-performance link. 
Our paper focuses on the governance environment, specifically the board structure 
and compensation committee composition. We examine the relation between CEO 
compensation and corporate performance and investigate the role played by the board of 
directors and a compensation committee on executive pay-performance link by using a 
sample of 362 listed firms from 2001 to 2004 and 492 listed firms from 2005 to 2007.  
In the next section, we begin with literature review and hypotheses development on 
Chinese executive pay-performance and corporate governance with particular emphasis 
on compensation committee, and then introduce the data and describe our empirical 
strategy in Section 3. The results are presented in Section 4, followed by a concluding 
section. 
 
2. CEO compensation, firm performance, and board characteristics 
 
Interest in the specific governance structures of Chinese publicly listed firms has been 
growing in response to the increasing stock market in China (see, for example, Schipani 
and Liu, 2002) and hence the need for better governance structures of Chinese listed 
firms. The board, as well as its sub-committees, plays a key role in enhancing corporate 
governance in light of the specific ownership issues and insider control in China. 
Therefore, research on the association between executive compensation, corporate 
performance, board composition and compensation committee has been increased 
recently, which will be the focus of our empirical analysis. 
 
2.1 CEO compensation and firm performance 
 
Aiming at aligning CEO’s interests with shareholder and maximizing shareholder 
wealth, the CEO compensation should be tied to firm performance (Fung et al., 2001), or 
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in other words, the pay-performance sensitivity should be high. Baker (1992), Dechow 
and Sloan (1991) and Kaplan (1994) all suggest that the CEO pay-performance relation is 
the essence of principal-agent theory. The determinants of executive compensation shed 
light on how effectively a firm address the divergent interests between management and 
shareholders. Thus, by tying executive compensation to firm performance, firms can 
align the interests of managers with owners (shareholders) (Murphy, 1999). Agency 
theory suggests a positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance and in 
order to confirm the relation, empirical studies have been done in different contexts but 
only found weak or even no relation between CEO pay and firm performance. Thus the 
focus has been turned to examine the impact of corporate governance in the setting of 
CEO pay. Compensation decisions are generally made by the board of directors in 
publically listed firms and hence prior literature has emphasized the key role played by 
the board in arranging executive compensation. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 
2004) suggest that lack of board oversight can contribute to CEO overcompensation. 
By using data from the US., UK., and elsewhere, numerous studies on the CEO pay-
performance relation have provided inconclusive results. For example, Gregg et al. (2005) 
examine the executive pay-performance relation for a sample of large UK firms over 
1994-2002 and find that over time there is little relationship between executive pay and 
performance. On the other hand, through their studies on listed firms in Korea, Kato et al. 
(2007) document a significant positive relation between executive cash compensation and 
stock market performance, however, the overall significant CEO pay-performance 
relation is driven by non-business group affiliations not business group affiliation firms.  
Kato and Long (2006b) affirm two types of acute principal-agent issues in China: the 
diverging interests between managers and shareholders and the diverging interests 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. They support that tying the 
wealth of managers to firm performance can align the interests of shareholders and those 
of managers. Hence, linking managers’ personal fortune to firm’s breaks up the 
“ligament” between the controlling shareholders and managers and thus helps in 
protecting the interests of minority shareholders.  
There is only a few research on the link of CEO compensation and firm performance 
in China and also provides mixed results. Kato and Long (2006a) find a positive 
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executive pay-performance relation by examining 937 listed firms from 1998 to 2002. 
Rui et al (2002) also support the study of Kato and Long (2006a) by providing evidence 
on a significant association between the return on assets and CEO compensation in 
Chinese listed firms while no such relation is found between stock returns and CEO 
compensation. However, the findings of Mengistae and Xu (2004) show that the CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the variance of performance by using a 
sample of 400 Chinese state-owned enterprises in the 1980s. They also find executive 
pay-performance sensitivity increases with managerial control and market competition 
faced by the firm. Moreover, Firth et al (2006) point out that the sensitivity of CEO pay 
and performance is low on average compared to Western counterparts while they 
document a relation between CEO cash compensation and firm performance in another 
study a year later (Firth et al., 2007). They provide evidence that ownership and 
governance factors are determinants of CEO cash compensation. 
In summary, although some extant research find no or little evidence on executive 
pay-performance relation, many prior theoretical and empirical studies document a 
positive relation between executive compensation and firm performance, suggesting that 
firm performance plays an important role in setting executive compensation contracts. 
Therefore, CEO pay-performance relation can be deemed as one indicator of corporate 
governance structures (Conyon and He, 2008) and hence other governance mechanisms 
can be investigated in light of CEO pay-performance relation. 
 
2.2 Board composition 
 
The amount of executive compensation and the extent of pay-for-performance for 
managers have been a considerable controversy topic in the academic and business 
communities. Critics of executive compensation practices argue that the board does not 
design the executive compensation schemes to maximize value of shareholders because 
of the CEO power on board (Core et al., 1999). Outside directors inclined to effectively 
monitor the management because they are less affected by CEO power and aim at 
protecting their reputations in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, 
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when outside directors are too busy, have insufficient information pertaining to the firm 
or get appointed by the CEO, they may perform less effectively (Jensen, 1993). 
There is a growing literature suggesting that the boards or the independent directors 
are ineffective. Employing data from the U.K., Conyon and Peck (1998) find that the 
outside directors on the board only have limited effects on executive compensation. 
Crystal (1991) points out that because the independent directors appointment decisions 
sometimes are made by the CEO, independent directors are unwilling to confront the 
CEO, especially concerning the executive compensation. That is, the boards may be 
ineffective in setting appropriate executive compensation to the maximization of 
shareholder value. On the other hand, Dahya and McConnell (2005) argue that the boards 
with a larger proportion of outside directors can make better decisions, specifically on the 
appointment of CEOs.  
In spite of the important and pivotal role play by the boards in setting executive 
compensation, there has been comparatively little China research with respect to this 
issue. This contrasts with the situation in the US, where there are studies on various 
dimensions of board and the relation between board and CEO compensation; examples of 
such research include the studies of Lambert et al. (1993) and Boyd (1994) suggesting 
that executive compensation is more linked with firm performance in firms with a larger 
proportion of outside directors on board. However, the exclusive focus on economies like 
the US makes it far from apparent that how would board independence affects executive 
compensation and pay-performance relation in transitional economies such as China. 
This leads to our investigation of the relation between board independence and executive 
pay-performance in China, an economy which, despite its increasing importance in global 
economy, is lack of empirical research on the effectiveness of its corporate governance 
structures. 
In Chinese listed firms, many directors found it difficult to exert any significant 
influence, other than figure influence, on the firm they serve. A survey in 1999 by Tenev 
and Zhang (2002) shows that only 3.1 percent of directors had independence to some 
extent. Consequently, the role of board and independent directors has attracted more 
concerns in China recently. For example, in August 2001, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102 “Guidelines for establishing an 
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independent directors system for listed companies” in which one third independent 
directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003. CSRC’s 2002 corporate governance 
code also requires that independent directors must spend enough time on the firms they 
serve and one director cannot hold more than five directorship positions at the same time. 
However, there is difference between Chinese boards and the US boards due to different 
legal and institutional contexts, even the boardroom in China is getting much closer to its 
US counterparts. The independent directors in US focus more on solving agency cost 
problem while the independent directors in China aim at protecting shareholders, 
specifically minority shareholders (Kato and Long, 2006a), due to different ownership 
structures in China. Furthermore, compared to China, the US has stronger securities 
regulation and more severe punishment for wrong-doing, resulting in higher costs for 
violations of securities law and regulations. Additionally, China has highly concentrated 
ownership when state dominates a large proportion of total shares. Combed together, the 
specific independent board structure and ownership structure make China an interesting 
example to examine the association between board structure and executive pay-
performance relation. 
As Finkelstein and Hambrick remarked, “Boards have long been considered to play 
an important role in the establishment of executive pay” (1996). However, as noted 
earlier, those studies on board structure and pay-performance relation provide mixed 
evidence, suggesting that further investigation is warranted. This idea gives rise to our 
first hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a. Top managers’ compensation is expected to be negatively associated 
with the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Hypothesis 1b. Companies with larger proportion of independent directors on the 
board will have a stronger link between their top managers’ pay and corporate 
performance than other companies. 
 
2.3 Compensation committee  
 
Today compensation committees are getting more engaged in corporate decisions. In 
terms of the effectiveness of boards, it is of importance to understand the fact that most 
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board functions are performed by sub-committees. As noted by Lorsch and Maclver 
(1989), “the work of the board is done in committees”. With respect to the design of 
executive pay scheme, compensation committee is the most important sub-committee 
under the board of directors. 
The characteristics of compensation committee have considerable impact on the 
effectiveness of compensation committee. Since early 1990s, compensation committee 
attracts more and more concerns from shareholders. From 1991 to 1995 there were 161 
shareholder proposals related to CEO compensation (Johnson and Shackell, 1997). 
Among them twenty proposals concern the issues of compensation committee 
independence. In the absence of compensation committee, there exists an opportunity for 
top management to award themselves compensation that are not to the maximization of 
shareholder value. Williamson (1985) comments that managers are likely to write their 
own pay contracts with one hand and sign them with the other in firms without 
compensation committees. Main and Johnston (1993) point out that a compensation 
committee is expected to exert an influence on top executive pay, which should be set in 
the interests of shareholders. However, simply reduce the pay of self-serving managers is 
not the only purpose of compensation committee, more importantly, economic and 
agency theories would suggest that directors on the compensation committee determine 
the appropriate design of executive pay and align the interests of management and 
shareholders (Conyon et al., 1995; Main and Johnston, 1993). 
Long used in the U.S., this compensation committee governance mechanism is 
comparatively new in China. Critics argue that most boards and committees in Chinese 
firms are lack of independence because politicians and owners controlled by the State sit 
on most boards and committees in response to the highly concentrated ownership. 
Therefore the corporate governance code of 2002 for Chinese listed firms states this: 
“Boards of listed firms are recommended to appoint compensation committees, 
consisting wholly or mainly of independent directors and chaired by an independent 
director and suggesting the board the compensation of the executive managers”. 
For most large companies in the U.S. and U.K., the decision of executive pay is 
delegated to a subcommittee, the compensation committee, of the board of directors. 
Consequently, the compensation committees play an important role in determining CEO 
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pay schemes in the firm’s best interests. However, limited extant evidence is provided on 
the characteristics and effectiveness of compensation committees. For example, Newman 
and Mozes (1999) focus on the relation between compensation committee and executive 
compensation by using a sample of 161 U.S. firms. They find that the sensitivity of 
executive pay to performance is lower when at least one member on the compensation 
committee is an insider. That is, the relation between CEO compensation and firm 
performance is more favourable to managers (at shareholders’ expense) in firms with 
insiders on the compensation committee. Moreover, Vafeas (2003) and Perry and Zenner 
(2001) find that the pay-for-performance relation is weaker and the level of executive 
compensation is higher in firms with insider-dominated compensation committee. 
However, by using a sample of 200 firms from Fortune 500 in 1992, Daily et al. (1998) 
did not find any evidence that the proportion of insider directors lead to greater level of 
executive compensation.  In addition, the findings of Anderson and Bizjak (2003) show 
some evidence that the more outside directors on the compensation committee the higher 
levels of CEO compensation and the higher pay-performance sensitivity. Interestingly, 
after ownership is controlled, they find no relation between compensation committee 
independence and total compensation. In UK., Conyon and Peck (1998) did not find any 
relation between the presence of compensation committee and CEO compensation level 
while they provides evidence that firms with outsider-dominated compensation 
committee have their CEO compensation more aligned with firm performance. 
Evidence is provided from countries other than the US and UK too. Sapp (2007) 
examines 400 large Canadian listed firms and finds an increase in the proportion of 
independent directors on the compensation committee increases the CEO compensation 
level. On the other hand, Conyon and He (2004) find no evidence that insiders on the 
compensation committee increase CEO pay. More recently, through their study on large 
Canadian corporations, Chowdhury and Wang (2009) document a significant effect of 
compensation committee independence on CEO contingent compensation. 
If inside directors intend to act in the interests of managers instead of the interests of 
shareholders, we expect that compensation committees with less proportion of 
independence directors are likely to pay CEO higher compensation and thus associated 
with less sensitive pay-performance relation. According to the Listed Company Rules and 
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Corporate Governance Code in 2002, the boards in Chinese listed firms may, with a 
general shareholders’ meeting resolution, set up sub-committees such as compensation 
committee and delegate the responsibility of setting executive compensation to their 
compensation committee. All members on the compensation committee are 
recommended to be directors. In addition, the compensation committee is suggested to be 
composed of a majority of independent directors and have independent director as the 
chair of committee. Other than the agency reasons noted earlier, the recent corporate 
governance reform and code in 2002 in China following the publication of the Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995) reports, and the policy changes occurred in the US after Enron, 
lead us to expect compensation committees to play an important role in linking executive 
compensation to firm performance. This contributes to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a. Top managers’ compensation is expected to be lower in companies 
that adopt compensation committees or have a larger proportion of independent directors 
on their compensation committees. 
Hypothesis 2b. The link between executive pay and firm performance is expected to 
be stronger in companies that adopt compensation committees or have a larger 
proportions of independent directors on their compensation committees. 
The role of compensation committee is to determine executive pay schemes or to 
make recommendations to the board of directors. Hence, the board inclined to adopt the 
recommendations from the compensation committee with possible modest modifications. 
If the compensation committee does not exist, the board of directors assumes the role of 
determining executive compensation. Additionally, it is believed that the presence of 
committees such as compensation committee may enhance the board’s power, especially 
when the CEO is not a member of the committees (see, for example, Andjelkovic et al., 
2002). The important role played by the compensation committee in CEO compensation 
decisions is also supported empirically (e.g., Belliveau et al., 1996). 
Meanwhile, the board of directors intends to represent shareholders’ interests and 
alleviate the interest conflicts between managers and shareholders. The compensation 
committee, a sub-committee under the board of directors, assesses executives’ 
performance, determines appropriate compensation packages and reports to the board.  
Therefore, the establishment of compensation committees, more specifically independent 
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compensation committees, has the potential to play an important role in designing 
executive compensation to align the interests of shareholders and managers by providing 
appropriate information to the board. Combined together, an alternative explanation for 
weak impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relation from prior 
research is the inexistence of compensation committee. This leads to our last hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2c. When compensation committee presents, executive compensation 
exhibits a stronger sensitivity to firm performance in firms with a larger portion of 
independent directors on board. 
  
3. Method 
3.1 Data and sample 
 
The sample consists of 1448 observations over a four-year period (from 2001 to 2004) 
for 362 publicly traded Chinese firms in Shanghai security exchange (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen security exchange (SZSE), and another sample consists of 1476 obversations 
over 2005-2007 for 492 publicly listed firms. Most prior CEO pay research in China 
employs sample window when the disclosure of executive compensation was voluntary 
and thus gives rise to selection effects and biases. Therefore, following Conyon and He 
(2008), we use data after 2001 with respect to the fact that executive compensation was 
required to be disclosed in annual reports since 1998, therefore mitigating such sample 
selection effects. On the other hand, started from 2005, non-tradable shares reform aims 
at changing the status of non-tradable shares to tradable shares. These changes may alter 
the governance structure of most Chinese listed firms which characterized with highly 
concentrated ownership of State. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect different pay-for-
performance after the commencement of non-tradable shares reform. To exclude the 
disturbing effects of that reform, we focus our research on data between 2001 and 2004. 
In later section, the sample between 2005 and 2007 is used to examine the possible 
changes in corporate governance when the non-tradable shares reform is considered. 
Specifically, we constructed the dataset by merging the following three separate 
databases. First, we used accounting, CEO compensation and other corporate governance 
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data from the database developed by SinoFin Information Services 3 . Second, we 
assembled basic data on compensation committees from China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Company4. Finally, from CCFR database developed by Tsinghua University, 
we collected data on stock returns. In response to the fact that the information of the 
independent directors on compensation committee is not provided by any database, we 
identify independent compensation committees by the information of committee 
memberships provided by CSMAR as well as annual report of listed firms.   
The final sample consists of data on 20 non-financial industries in terms of standard 
industrial classification codes of CSRC during the time periods from 2001 to 2004. 
Among them, we only select manufacturing firms as our sample firms for three reasons. 
First, in response to the fact that manufacturing industry accounts for about 60% listed 
firms (711 listed manufacturing firms in the whole 1243 listed Chinese firms in 2004; 
sales and the book value of assets of manufacturing firms take up almost 50% of total 
listed firms) in China and it uses pretty similar executive pay schemes. Therefore, the 
executive pay-performance of manufacturing firms is expected to represent the whole 
picture of Chinese listed firms. Second, government focuses more on manufacturing and 
thus the relation between executive compensation and performance should be most 
evident in manufacturing industry. Furthermore, using manufacturing firms reduces our 
industry classifications from 20 to 9 (Standard Industrial Sub-classification codes in 
Manufacturing Industry of CSRC), resulting in less excessive dummy variable issues. We 
only include observations for the nine industries that have at least ten observations with 
complete data so that we can generate reasonable estimates for the sub-industry indicator 
variables in our study. Finally, we delete observations without the availability of 
executive compensation, accounting and financial data, and corporate governance data 
that this study needs, leaving a final sample of 362 firms and 1448 firm-year observations. 
                                                            
3 Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on Chinese corporate governance, for example, 
see, Kato and Long, 2006a. 
4 Prior research has used CSMAR data set in their studies on Chinese corporate governance, for example, 
see, Bai et al., 2003; Sun and Tong, 2003; and Bai et al., 2004. 
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Like the study of Core et al. (1999), the variables proxying for the economic determinants 
of executive compensation were lagged one year to reduce potential endogeneity.  
 
3.2 CEO compensation and firm performance 
 
We focus on cash compensation because we are interested in the reward portion of 
total compensation. Hence, the cash compensation can be viewed as ex-post 
compensation depending on past and current performance (see, for example, Gaver and 
Gaver, 1998; Comprix and Mueller, 2006). Following Leone et al. (2006), we use the 
sum of bonus and salary, which is the total cash compensation, as the measurement of 
executive compensation. Moreover, we employ the nature log of cash compensation like 
most prior studies (see, e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The nature log can mitigate the 
difference in executive compensation across firms and hence reduce heteroskedasticity. 
Among the alternative measures of executive compensation provided in the SinoFin 
database, average pay of top three highest-paid executives, which composes of the salary 
and bonus, resembles most prior studies on executive compensation and thus will be the 
focus of our study. In Table 2, we present summary statistics concerning financial 
variables, CEO characteristics, board and firm-specific measures. Descriptive statistics 
for CEO compensation are summarized in panel A where all compensations are in 2000-
constant Yuan5. Over the sample period of 2001-2007 average cash compensation of 
executive managers was on average about 182,309.3 Yuan (or approximately USD 22,789) of 
2000-constant Yuan, which is much lower than that of their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan6. 
The mean CEO compensations are 81,750 Yuan, 111,322 Yuan, 141,984 Yuan, 178,158 Yuan, 
207,196 Yuan, 242,590 Yuan, and 313,164 Yuan in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 
2007 respectively. That is, the average CEO compensation almost increased by 400% in 7 years. 
The pay ranges from 10,804 to 423,700 Yuan, 6,607 to 741,684 Yuan, 21,782 to 675,677 Yuan, 
                                                            
5 In response to lagged sales, we consistently express both CEO compensation amount and sales in 2000-
constant Yuan. All price changes are made according to CPI (Consumer Price Index) in China between 
2000 to 2007. 
6 For example, Core et al. (1999) report an average of cash compensation of USD 614,000 for a sample of 
205 firms between 1982 and 1984. 
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13,333 to 1,336,464 Yuan, 18,333 to 1,681,333 Yuan, 6000 to 3,016,200 Yuan, and 21,318 to 
3,500,000 Yuan in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively.  
In panel B the firms with compensation committee tend to pay their executives more than 
firms without compensation committee (151,871 of 2000-constant Yuan vs. 115,722 of 2000-
constant Yuan for CEOCOM and 11.64 vs. 11.30 for ln(CEOCOM)). 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) employed return on assets as accounting measurement 
and stock returns as financial measurement. As they noted, return on assets, as one of the 
accounting numbers, are subject to the earnings management of management while stock 
returns are harder to manipulate. However, stock returns involve the effects of variability 
of stock market and macro-economics which are outside the control of management. 
More recently, it has become more popular to use the market or industry adjusted market 
performance as the benchmark for firm-specific performance measurements. We use 
return on assets (ROA) as our accounting performance measure, while we also use 
industry-adjusted stock returns as our financial performance measure to verify the 
robustness of our results. We define ROA as the ratio of net income to the book value of 
assets 7 . Our measure of industry-adjusted stock return is measured as annual stock 
returns minus industry mean stock returns. In our regressions, total cash compensation of 
CEO is used, contemporaneous and lagged performance measures can both impact the 
executive cash compensation and hence we use lagged performance in our study. As a 
sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses with contemporaneous performance measurements 
and receive similar results. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the average rate of return on 
assets (ROA) was 4% over the sample period and it was the same for firms with CC and 
for firms without CC (4% vs. 4%). Whilst firms without CC experienced a lower 
industry-adjusted stock returns compared to firms with CC (1% vs. 2%) and the average 
stock return over the sample period was 1%, that is, firms with CC grew faster than firms 
without CC on stock performance. To further examine if compensation committee affect 
CEO compensation, board characteristics and firm performance differently, we also 
present CEO compensation, firm performance and other firm characteristics separately 
for firms with CC and without CC. In terms of the Wilcoxon test, CEO compensation, 
firm performance and board characteristics in firms without CC are all significantly 
                                                            
7 Using operating earnings for our tests gives similar results. 
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smaller than firms with CC while sales figure, state, lagnegprofit and stdret are similar 
between firms with CC and firms without CC. 
Most empirical studies on CEO compensation use data for individual executives from 
U.S. firms while the closest studies to ours are Kaplan (1994) and Kato et al. (2007) that 
used similar executive compensation data for Japanese and Korean firms. We begin with 
estimating the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, like Kaplan (1994). That is, 
uePerformancceocom ++= βα)ln(                                     (1) 
ROA and stock returns provide different indicators of a firm’s performance and thus 
they are associated with different pay-performance sensitivities for executive pay. We use 
ln(CEOCOM) because ln(CEOCOM) is more likely than CEOCOM  to be normally 
distributed.     
                 
3.3 Board characteristics 
 
There are numerous studies on the impact of board independence on the association 
between executive compensation and firm performance. However, those studies provide 
mixed evidence, suggesting that further investigation is warranted. To examine our first 
hypotheses we collect data on the board characteristics. In particular, we determine the 
proportion of independent directors, board size and the number of board meetings. Large 
boards are likely to be less effective than small boards because large boards may have 
free-riding problems in decision making (Jensen, 1993) and hence tend to compromise 
and make decisions in favour of managers’ rather than shareholders’ interests (Yermack, 
1996). As shown in Panel B Table 2, the proportion of independent directors on board is 
about 24% in full sample when the firms with CC have a much higher percentage of 
independent directors on board than firms without CC (31% vs. 20%). The mean board 
size is 9.75, comparable to the average board size 13 for U.S. firms (Core et al., 1999). In 
terms of board diligence, the average annual board meetings were 7.14 over the sample 
period and the frequency is higher for firms with CC than for firms without CC (7.6 vs. 
7). 
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Following our baseline model, we investigate the impact of board independence on 
the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, an adaption of the model in Kaplan (1994). 
That is, 
uePerformancBoardindBoardindePerformancceocom ++++= *)ln( 321 βββα   (2) 
Where ln(CEOCOM) is CEO compensation, calculated as the sum of top three 
highest executive compensation divided by three; Performance is return on assets (ROA); 
Boardind is the proportion of independent directors on board. The value of 3β  indicates 
the impact of board independence on CEO pay-performance relation and is our interest of 
variable. 
 
3.4 Compensation committee 
 
Following our baseline model again, this time we test the impact of compensation 
committee independence on the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, an adaption 
of the model in Kaplan (1994). That is, 
uiablesOther
ePerformancCCindCCindePerformancceocom
++
+++=
var
*)ln(
4
321
β
βββα
      (3) 
In other variables, we define an indicator variable “paiddirector” to be equal to one if 
at least one member on the compensation committee gets paid from the firm they serve 
and zero otherwise. In addition, smaller compensation committees may have a shortage 
of monitor on management (Bushman et al., 2004) while larger compensation committees 
may be less easily influenced by CEOs. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that 
lower cooperation costs and less free-riding may make small boards more effective. Thus, 
it is possible that small compensation committees can be more effective. We use the 
nature log of the number of directors on the compensation committees as one 
characteristic of compensation committee. 
As indicated in Panel B Table 2, on average 35% firms formed their compensation 
committees over the sample period. Moreover, we can see from Panel C and Panel D of 
Table 2 that over the sample period 21, 112, 172 and 199 firms set up their compensation 
committees in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively. Then 309, 335, and 355 firms set 
up their compensation committees in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. The mean 
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proportion of independent directors increased a little in 2002 and then remained constant 
as well as committee size (56%, 60%, 61% and 61% in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 for 
CCIND and 1.26, 1.25, 1.27, 1.25 from 2001 to 2004 for ln(comsize), respectively) when 
the mean proportion of independent directors kept constant over 2005-2007 (62%, 61% 
and 61% in 2005, 2006 and 2007 for CCIND). Finally, the percentage of firms that have 
at least one director on compensation committee getting paid by the firm is 71%, 59%, 
61% and 58% in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively. 
 
3.5 Other variables 
 
We include several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firm-
specific characteristics that influence executive compensation. First, firm size is 
measured by ln(sales). Prior literature has shown that firm size is positively associated 
with executive compensation significantly (for example, Firth et al., 2007). Thus, we use 
lagged ln(sales) as our proxy for firm size.  
We also collect data on ownership structure, including the concentration of ownership 
of the second to fifth largest stockholders. If the State is the major shareholder in a firm 
then the variable state is coded one and zero otherwise. The state is the largest 
shareholder in about 78% of the observations. 
Listed firms in China have two common features, the highly concentrated ownership 
and predominance of state ownership (Kato and Long, 2006b). Kato and Long (2004) 
suggest that state ownership in Chinese listed firms weakens CEO pay-performance link 
and hence makes firms less effective.  
Firm risk is a measure of the firm’s information environment and the risk of its 
operating environment (Core et al., 1999) and thus is a potential determinant of the level 
of executive compensation. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) document a significant 
decrease in pay-performance sensitivity with a decrease in the variance of firm 
performance, owing to the trade-off of executive incentives against the allocation of 
performance risk. High firm risk is passed to managers and thus higher executive 
compensation is demanded. In our study, firm risk is defined as the standard deviation of 
the monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months. 
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Iyengar et al. (2005) find a significant positive relation between firm performance and 
executive compensation for all-equity firms while no such relation discerned for high-
levered firms. Therefore, leverage is expected to play an important role in executive pay-
performance relation in terms of the potential agency costs of debt. We therefore include 
leverage rate as control variable, which is measured as the book value of debt to the book 
value of shareholders’ equity. 
Sun and Cahan (2009) find that the positive effect of compensation committee quality 
on the executive pay-performance relation is less for high growth firms or loss-making 
firms. In order to include the impact of growth opportunity in executive compensation 
research, we also use lagged market value to book value of assets as a proxy for growth 
opportunities, like prior studies (e.g. Firth et al., 2007). Moreover, a dummy variable is 
defined to indicate if the firm made a loss in the previous year.  
The mean leverage rate was 1.17 over the sample period and it was higher for firms 
with CC than for firms without CC (1.33 vs. 1.08). The data in Panel B of Table 2 also 
shows a higher sales in 2000-constant Yuan for firms with CC than for firms without CC 
(1,580 Yuan vs. 1,560 Yuan). Firms without CC have a higher ownership concentration 
than firms with CC (0.27 vs. 0.23 for H5). Moreover, State-owned firms are more likely 
to form a compensation committee (82% State-owned firms in firms with CC and 79% 
State-owned firms in firms without CC). With regard to stock return variance, firms with 
CC experienced the same firm risk as firms without CC while they experienced a lower 
growth opportunity than their counterparts (3.76 vs. 4.44). Finally, the average likelihood 
of making a negative pre-tax profit was about 7% for all firms. firms with CC are much 
more likely to make a negative pre-tax profit than firms without CC (8% vs. 6%). 
Other factors are included in our study to account for industry and year effects (see 
Table 1 for the definitions). Industry is defined in terms of the securities exchange 
classifications and year is measured by three indicator variables. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The pay-performance relation 
In this section, we use multivariate analysis to test our five hypotheses. We examine 
how board structure and CC structure affect levels of executive compensation and 
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executive pay-performance relation and whether the presence of CC is associated with 
more effective board as well as more sensitive executive pay-performance relation. 
 
4.1.1 Board results 
 
The cross-sectional multiple regression results are shown in Table 3. Parameter 
estimates are given along with the corresponding heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors and p-values8. In panel A, we use lagged return on assets (ROA) and then test the 
robustness of the model estimates of the impact of board independence on executive pay-
performance link by considering alternative performance measures (Panel B). Model 1 
shows the results for firm performance (ROA, RET) in terms of board characteristics 
when other firm-specific characteristics are not included. Following Fan et al. (2007), 
model 2 tests for a possible curvilinear relation between firm performance and executive 
compensation when model 3 further adds industry and year control variables. The 
coefficients for the year and industry indicator variables are not reported in the tables 
because they are not of direct interest for this study.  
We then compute variance inflation factors (VIF) for main variables and they are all 
below 8.2. These diagnostic statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major 
problem in our models.  
The regression model 3 also contains three indicator variables that control for the year 
in which executive compensation was paid and eight indicator variables that control for 
sub-industry membership9. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients on the accounting performance measure (ROA) 
and on the financial performance measure (RET) are expected to be positive; that is, the 
                                                            
8 We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors because the Breusch Pagan (1979) test is significant 
(p-values<0.05) for the test models of hypotheses 1. To test for autocorrelation at the panel level, the 
approach outlined in Wooldridge (2002) as implemented by Drukker (2003) is used. For all the regression 
analyses this test shows that autocorrelation is not evident. 
9 The regression analysis makes several important assumptions. First of all, we include only manufacturing 
firms in our sample and thus the regression coefficients are reasonably assumed to be identical across firms. 
However, we partially control for potential sub-industry and year differences by incorporating indicator 
variables to capture mean shifts for the dependent variable. Second, the error terms are assumed to be 
independent.  
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better the firm performance, the higher the executive compensation. Additionally, the 
sign of the estimated coefficient on the proportion of directors on board is expected to be 
negative, which is our first hypothesis. According to our hypothesis, the expected sign on 
the coefficient of the interaction term ROA*boardind (or RET*boardind) is positive; that 
is, the executive pay-performance relation is stronger in firms with more independent 
directors on board than in firms with less independent directors on board. In accordance 
with most of the published literature, the signs on ln(boardsize), sales, stdret and 
opportunityg are expected to be positive while the signs on state and lagnegprofit are 
expected to be negative. We do not make priori predictions regarding the signs of the 
estimated coeffients on boardmeeting, h5 and LEV because prior evidence is either not 
compelling or is mixed. 
Table 3 summarizes the regression estimates of Eq.(2) for our sample. Model 1 
focused on what board characteristics could impact the level of executive compensation 
and pay-performance relation. The proportion of directors on board has significant effects 
on executive pay-performance relation statistically and economically as we expected. 
However, the sign on coefficient of board independence is opposite to our expectation 
and significant when the estimates on other coefficients are not significant.  
Model 2 is used to test for a possible curvilinear relationship between firm 
performance and executive compensation; the squared term of firm performance was 
included in the equation. The squared term was not significant for both accounting and 
finance measurements, resulting in no curvilinear relation between performance and CEO 
pay. Model 3 examines the main effects of board independence on executive 
compensation and pay-performance relation controlling all other main possible 
determinants of executive pay. The effect of board independence on executive pay-
performance relation remains significant statistically and economically after controlling 
main factors. Interestingly, the coefficient on board independence changed from 
positively significant to insignificant when the sign also changed. Thus, board 
independence is shown to have no significant effects on executive compensation while it 
is shown to have significant effects on executive pay-performance relation. That is, firms 
with larger proportion of independent directors on board will not change the level of 
executive compensation but will strengthen the relation between executive pay and firm 
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performance and thus enhance internal corporate governance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is 
not supported whilst Hypothesis 1b is strongly supported. 
To examine the effect of board independence further, we divide the sample according 
to whether the board is bigger, whether the accounting performance is higher, and 
whether the proportion of independent directors on board is greater than one-third. The 
results are presented in Table 4. All regression analyses focus on our main firm 
performance ROA. First, independent directors are likely to exert different influence on 
corporate governance structure when the level of accounting performance is different. 
Therefore, we use one indicator variable to indicate whether the ROA is the highest (in 
the highest quartile of ROA) or lowest (in the lowest quartile of ROA), resulting in two 
sub-samples. The results in Table 4 show a significantly positive relation between board 
independence and executive pay-performance relation in well performing firms while 
their counterparts do not. Moreover, it suggests that the impact of board independence on 
executive pay-performance relation in full sample is basically driven by those well 
performing firms.  
Secondly, we create an indicator variable to indicate whether the firms have very 
large boards (in the top quartile of board size) or very small boards (in the bottom quartile 
of board size). The results show that the estimates on coefficients of board independence 
are not significant for both sub-samples. Interestingly, the estimates on coefficients of the 
interaction term (ROA*boardind) are significantly positive for both sub-samples (p=0.03 
for small boards and p=0.01 for large boards). That is, the board independence is 
positively associated with executive pay-performance relation only when the firm has a 
very large board or a very small board. A possible explanation for the results is that when 
the board is very small, directors, specifically independent directors can avoid free-riding 
issues and are less influenced by CEO and thus do their job more effectively as suggested 
by most prior literature. On the other hand, concerning the corporate governance context 
in China, most board is believed to be a figure board and independent directors cannot 
exert much influence on CEO compensation. But when the board is very large, the 
influence of board becomes larger and thus the influence of independent directors on the 
firm becomes larger. Additionally, larger boards have a potential advantage in their 
advising role and are more capable of accomplishing the resource provision role of the 
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board (Coles et al., 2008). Consequently, Chinese independent directors work effectively 
in setting executive compensation when they serve on a very large or small board.  
Finally, we use another indicator variable to indicate whether the proportion of 
independent directors is greater than 30%10. Two sub-samples are tested to see if the 
proportion of independent directors more than required percentage makes any difference 
in their effectiveness. The results are also presented in Table 4. They show a significant 
positive effect of board independence on executive pay-performance and a marginal 
significant negative effect of board independence on executive compensation (p=0.09)  in 
firms with less than 30% independent directors as our Hypotheses 1a and 1b expected. 
However, no such significant effects are found in firms with more than 30% independent 
directors on board, suggesting a more cosmetic board in Chinese listed firms as long as 
they already have required percentage of independent directors on board. 
 
4.1.2 Compensation committee results 
 
The questions, to which we now turn, are whether the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance is stronger for those firms with more independent 
directors on the compensation committee than the firms with less independent directors 
on the compensation committee.  
We investigate the regressions by creating sub-sample. To be included in the sub-
sample, these firms are required to (1) have a CC; (2) have at least three years of 
contiguous data between 2001 and 2004. We collect a 4-year panel of executive 
compensation data from 2001 to 2004 yielding a total 392 firm-years. 
Table 5 summarizes the regression estimates of Eq. (3) to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
for our panel. We estimate separate regressions using ROA and RET as our performance 
measures in Panel A and Panel B when heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the nature log of executive cash 
compensation and the effect of the presence of CC and CC independence are tested on 
                                                            
10  In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102 
“Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies” in which one third 
independent directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003. 
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executive pay-performance relation. The estimates on coefficients of control variables are 
not reported here because they are not of direct interests for our study. In the second 
column of Table 5, we investigate the impact of the presence of CC on the level of 
executive compensation as well as on executive pay-performance relation. The 
coefficient of the interaction term of CC presence and firm performance is not significant 
for both performance measurements. Moreover, the estimates of coefficient on CC are 
both significantly positive, which is to the contrast of our Hypothesis 2a and 2b, 
suggesting an unimportant role played by CC in Chinese listed firms. In the second 
column, we investigate the impact of CC independence on executive compensation as 
well as pay-performance relation and find no significant estimates for our interests of 
variables. That is, neither the presence of CC nor the independence of CC is shown as 
having any effect on executive compensation. On the other hand, as we expected, as long 
as at least one member on CC gets paid by the firm the level of executive compensation 
is higher. 
To further examine the effect of CC, we divide the CC firm sub-sample again 
according to whether the proportion of independent directors on CC is greater than 60%11. 
That is, the CC firm sub-sample was further divided to two sub-samples with regard to 
different CC independence. The ROA in firms with more than 60% independent directors 
on CC positively associates with executive compensation. Moreover, the coefficient of 
ROA is statistically and economically significant. Therefore, even the estimate on the 
coefficient of the interaction of CC independence and ROA is significantly (but is not 
significant economically) negative, the partial effect of ROA on executive pay is still 
positive. On the other hand, those firms with less than 60% independent directors on CC 
show a positively significant effect of CC independence on executive pay-performance 
relation although the beta is not large (β =0.08). Thus, not like their counterparts, firms 
with less than 60% CC independence partially strengthen their executive pay-
performance link when they increase their CC independence. In addition, the presence of 
paid director on CC shows significantly positive effect on executive pay for both sub-
samples. We also get similar results when we change the performance measurement to 
                                                            
11 The proportion of independent directors on CC mostly concentrates on the range of 40%-70% in Chinese 
listed firms; therefore we select the cut-off point as 60% to keep sufficient variability in our sample. 
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stock returns (RET) which presented in Panel B. Consequently, neither the presence of 
CC nor the CC independence show any important effect on the level of executive pay or 
pay-performance relation, but firms with high CC independence do present some positive 
impact of CC independence to enhance the relation of executive pay and firm 
performance, providing no support for Hypothesis 2a while providing partial support for 
Hypothesis 2b. 
 
4.1.3 Board independence and the presence of compensation committee 
 
Next, to test our hypothesis developed in previous section that the pay-performance 
relations are stronger for firms with larger proportion of independent directors on board 
when the compensation committee presents, we classify all firms into firms with CC and 
firms without CC and estimate the impact of board independence on executive pay-
performance separately. 
The results of our regressions using Eq. (2) are presented in Tables 6. The results for 
control variables are not reported because they are not of direct interests to our analysis. 
In Panel A of Table 6, the beta of ROA*boardind is 13.39, indicating a strong significant 
effect of board independence on executive pay-performance relation statistically and 
economically for firms with CC. Although the coefficient of ROA is negatively 
significant in firms with CC, the beta is much smaller compared to the beta of 
ROA*boardind, resulting in a positive partial effect of ROA on executive compensation. 
On the other hand, board independence does not show any significant impact on either 
executive compensation or pay-performance relation in firms without CC while board 
independence in full sample is positively significantly associated with stronger executive 
pay-performance relation. That is, the effect of board independence on executive pay-
performance in full sample is mostly driven by firms with CC, offering strong support for 
our Hypothesis 2c. Then we use the alternative performance measurement RET to test the 
robustness of our results in Panel B and  receive similar results. Consequently, the results 
strongly support Hypothesis 2c, suggesting that independent directors are likely to work 
more effectively on executive compensation setting if they formed compensation 
committee.  
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4.2 Further tests on the effect of compensation committee and board 
characteristics 
 
In terms of the results from prior section, the hypothesis was supported that when 
compensation committee presents a larger portion of independent directors on board 
enhances the link between executive compensation and performance. To further test the 
effects of compensation committee, following Wild (1994), we examine the effect of 
board independence on executive pay-performance relation before and after the formation 
of compensation committee. 
The primary tests of the hypotheses of our study focus on the magnitude of the slope 
parameter from the regression of executive compensation on firm performance and board 
independence. Specifically, the following regression is executed: 
uROABoardindBoardindROAceocom ++++= −− 13211 *)ln( βββα            (4a) 
Where ln(CEOCOM) and Boardind are as defined in Table 1, 1β  is the pay-
performance relation and 3β  is the variable of interest in our study, indicating the impact 
of board independence on executive pay-performance relation. In order to eliminate the 
tax impact, we use pre-tax profit to calculate ROA-1 (return on assets, lagged one year) 
instead of net income in the regressions. 
The regression results for Eq. (4a) are reported in Panel A of Table 7. As expected, 
the parameter 3β  on ROA-1*Boardind, when using all periods’ data, is positive (5.16) and 
significantly greater than zero at the 0.001 level. The central hypothesis to be examined is 
whether or not the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance is greater after 
committee formation than before. The second and third rows in Panel A of Table 7 present 
regression results for the periods before and the periods after formation. Consistent with increased 
board effectiveness, a larger proportion of independent directors on board is positively associated 
with stronger executive pay-performance relation (p=0.002) for the periods after committee 
formation while no significant relation between board independence and executive pay-
performance is found for the periods before committee formation. 
As another test of the hypothesis, a second regression equation is formulated as follows: 
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In this case, Post equals one if it is in the time periods after the committee formation, 
and equals zero otherwise. A test of the primary hypothesis is equivalent to a test of the 
alternative hypothesis that the coefficient 5β  is significantly greater than zero.  
The estimation results for the regression in Eq. (4b) are reported in Panel B of Table 7. The 
estimated coefficient 5β , in a test for a change in the effect of board independence on executive 
pay-performance relation from the periods before to the periods after formation, is positive (6.49) 
and is marginal significant (p=0.065). The evidence indicates that the effect of board 
independence on executive pay-performance is significantly greater after formation than before. 
That is, the hypothesis that greater board independence can strengthen the relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance when the compensation 
committee presents is supported again by testing time periods before and after the 
committee formation. 
In order to investigate the effect of board and compensation committees in more 
details, we also run regressions for firms with CC and without CC over 2005-2007, 
during which the non-tradable shares reform was introduced and progressed in China. It 
can be seen from Table 8 that board independence shows a significant negative effect on 
CEO pay-performance relation for those firms without CC (β=-6.35) while board 
independence affects firms with CC in an insignificant way, supporting our previous 
evidence that independent directors work more effectively in firms with CC than in firms 
without CC. Moreover, in Table 9, we use one indicator variable to indicate whether the 
ROA is the highest (in the top quartile of ROA) or lowest (in the bottom quartile of 
ROA), resulting in two sub-samples. Interestingly, even though the interaction term 
ROA*COMCIND in best-performing firms shows a marginal significant negative 
association, it is not economically significant, and if combined with the effect of ROA 
(β =8.86, p=0.03), CEO pay-performance relation would be significantly positive, 
compared with poorly-performing firms. Consequently, best-performing firms link their 
CEO compensation with firm performance much closer than those poorly-performing 
firms after the non-tradable shares reform started, suggesting better corporate governance 
in best-performing firms. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
 
As Finkelstein and Hambrick remarked, “Boards have long been considered to play 
an important role in the establishment of executive pay” (1996). However, as noted 
earlier, those studies on board structure and pay-performance relation provide mixed 
evidence in both Western countries and transitional economies such as China. This paper 
has provided the first rigorous estimates on the effect of board independence on executive 
pay-performance for Chinese listed firms with and without a compensation committee. 
To do so, we have assembled the panel data (that provide information not only on 
executive compensation and firm performance but also on compensation committee 
composition) for 362 manufacturing listed firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets from 2001 to 2004 as well as 492 manufacturing listed firms from 2005-2007.  
Contrary to a popular belief that Chinese corporate governance, specifically the 
executive compensation scheme, does not work effectively, we provide new empirical 
evidence. Moreover, the function of Chinese boards and their sub-committees is believed 
to be more cosmetic than effective. However, we have found that executive cash 
compensation is more related to accounting and stock market performance when the 
proportion of independent directors on board is larger. And our results show that the 
independent directors on board work more effectively on setting executive compensation 
to the maximum of shareholder wealth if they have a compensation committee to offer 
them help and provide information. Perhaps even more importantly, our analysis has 
further revealed for the first time that such overall significant effect of board 
independence on executive pay-performance link is driven by firms with a compensation 
committee and that no such relation exists for firms without a compensation committee. 
As such, our study complements earlier works which tend to point to significant impact 
of board independence on executive pay-performance relation in general. 
Our results also suggest that independent directors on board are more likely to be a 
good governance mechanism in setting optimal executive compensation when they 
formed their compensation committee. As such, our findings may partially explain the 
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reason why prior literature provides mixed evidence on board effectiveness in terms of 
setting appropriate executive pay.  
Further investigation also shows that the positive effect of board independence on 
executive pay-performance link is more evident in well performing firms and in firms 
with very large or very small board. That is, firm performance and the size of board may 
affect the effectiveness of independent directors on setting optimal executive 
compensation. Finally, extended findings clarify that board independent is positively 
significantly associated with stronger executive pay-performance relation in time periods 
after than before the formation of compensation committee, supporting the important role 
played by a compensation committee. 
However, no significant relation was found in our study about the impact of 
compensation committee independence on executive pay-performance relation. 
Consequently, the independent directors on compensation committee alone are not found 
to have significant effect on setting optimal executive compensation, while our results 
suggest that the existence of compensation committee can assist independent directors on 
board to design appropriate executive compensation.  
Our results from the regressions for firms with a CC and without a CC over 2005-
2007 indicate that during the non-tradable shares reform, board independence shows a 
significant negative effect on CEO pay-performance relation for those firms without a CC 
(β=-6.35) while board independence affects firms with a CC in an insignificant way, 
supporting our previous evidence that independent directors work more effectively in 
firms with a CC than in firms without a CC. In addition, best-performing firms are more 
likely to link their CEO compensation with firm performance than those poorly-
performing firms since the non-tradable shares reform, suggesting better corporate 
governance in best-performing firms. 
Based on our knowledge, there is no prior research on the link of executive pay-
performance relation and the change of ownership structure focusing on the time periods 
after the non-tradable shares reform. In our future work, we will investigate the impact of 
the change of ownership structure on executive pay-performance link since the start of 
the reform. To do so, we will need to continue to collect the board, ownership movement 
and executive compensation data in the coming years as non-tradable shares reform 
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progresses, in particular the adoption of a compensation committee and its composition 
are implemented. 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
CEO compensation
Ln(ceocom) 
 (nature 
logarithm) 
the nature logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, 
calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three 
highest-paid executives by three 
Firm performance
ROA The lagged ROA, which is calculated as net income divided by the 
book value of assets of the previous year  
RET The lagged industry-adjusted annual stock returns, which is calculated 
as stock returns minus sub-industry (of manufacturing industry) mean 
stock returns for the previous year 
Compensation committee
CC Equal to 1 if compensation committee exists, 0 otherwise 
Ln(comsize) 
(nature 
logarithm) 
Natural log of the total number of directors serving on the 
compensation committee 
Ccind(%) The proportion of independent directors on the compensation 
committee
paiddirector Equal to one if at least one member on the compensation committee 
gets paid from the firm they serve and zero otherwise 
Board characteristics
boardind The proportion of independent directors on board 
Ln(boardsize) The natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on board 
boardmeeting The number of board meetings for the current year 
Firm-level control variables
Lev leverage rate (total debt/total assets) 
Ln(sales)  Natural log of sales for the year prior (i.e., 2000) to the year in which 
executive compensation is awarded (i.e., 2001) 
H5 Herfindahl_5 index, the sum of squared percent of the shareholdings of 
the top five largest shareholders
state Dummy variables, equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is the State 
lagnegprofit Dummy variable, equal to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 
0 otherwise
stdret Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the year 
Growth-
opportunity 
Year-end market to book ratio of assets in the previous year 
industry Dummy variables, 9 sub-industries in manufacturing industry 
according to Standard Industrial Classification of CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission) 
Year Dummy variables, 4 years in the sample 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for CEO compensation and its hypothesized determinants 
The sample consists of 1448 annual observations of 362 firms between 2001 and 2004, 
and 1476 annual observations of 492 firms between 2005 and 2007, which is during the 
non-tradable shares reform. Compensation amounts and sales are expressed in 2000 Yuan. 
Panel A: CEO compensation 
 Year No. Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Ceocom 2001 362 81,750.6 68,101.2 10,804.4 423,700.8 
 2002 362 111,322.9 97,630.6 6,607.0 741,684.3 
 2003 362 141,983.7 112,219.0 21,782.2 675,676.6 
 2004 362 178,158.3 165,354.3 13,333.3 1,336,464 
 2005 492 207,195.5 184,487.2 18,333.3 1,681,333 
 2006 492 242,590.2 232,526.6 6,000 3,016,200 
 2007 492 313,163.7 304,078.7 21,318 3,500,000 
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Panel B: Summary of CEO compensation, firm performance, board characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics 
 All firms Non-CC firms CC firms 
 N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. Test: difference 
in means 
CEO 
compensation 
          
ceocom 1448 128,303 121,577 944 115,721 112,020 504 151,870 134,693 *** 
Ln(ceocom) 1448 11.42 .84 944 11.30 .85 504 11.64 .77 *** 
Firm 
performance 
          
roa 1398 .04 .05 895 .04 .05 503 .04 .05 * 
ret 1448 .01 .31 944 .01 .34 504 .02 .24 *** 
Board 
characteristic 
          
boardsize 1448 9.70 2.28 944 9.56 2.35 504 9.96 2.13 *** 
Ln(boardsize) 1448 2.24 .23 944 2.23 .24 504 2.28 .22 *** 
boardmeeting 1448 7.14 2.73 944 6.93 2.68 504 7.55 2.79 *** 
boardind 1448 .24 .14 944 .20 .14 504 .31 .09 *** 
CC 1448 .35 .48 944 0 0 504 1 0 *** 
Firm-level 
control 
          
lev 1448 1.17 1.44 944 1.08 1.20 504 1.33 1.79 *** 
Sales (millions of 
yuans) 
1448 1,560 2,480 944 1,560 2,480 504 1,580 2,470 0 
Ln(sales) 1448 20.45 1.16 944 20.44 1.16 504 20.46 1.15 0 
H5 1448 .26 .15 944 .27 .16 504 .23 .14 *** 
state 1448 .80 .40 944 .79 .41 504 .82 .39 0 
lagnegprofit 1448 .07 .25 944 .06 .25 504 .08 .26 0 
stdret 1448 .09 .03 944 .09 .02 504 .09 .03 0 
Growth-
opportunity 
(opportunityg) 
1448 4.21 2.72 944 4.44 2.78 504 3.76 2.54 *** 
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Panel C: Summary of compensation committee characteristics, 2001-2004 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 
CC Yes (numbers) 21 112 172 199 
 No (numbers) 341 250 190 163 
Ccind(%) Mean 56.31 60.62 61.24 60.97 
 S.D. 23.13 13.89 12.80 14.06 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 100 100 100 100 
Ln(comsize) Mean 1.26 1.25 1.27 1.25 
 S.D. .33 .26 .29 .30 
 Minimum .69 .69 0 0 
 Maximum 1.61 1.95 1.95 1.95 
Paiddirector Mean .71 .59 .61 .58 
 S.D. .47 .49 .49 .50 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 1 1 1 1 
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Panel D: Summary of compensation committee characteristics, 2005-2007 
  2005 2006 2007  
CC Yes (numbers) 309 335 355  
 No (numbers) 183 157 137  
Ccind(%) Mean 61.60 61.48 61.18  
 S.D. 12.2 12.83 13.65  
 Minimum 0 0 0  
 Maximum 100 100 100  
Sample consists of 1448 firm-years of data for 362 publically traded manufacturing firms 
during the years 2001-2004, and 1476 firm-years of data for 492 publically listed 
manufacturing firms during the years 2005-2007. 
The average CEO compensation, firm-specific characteristics and firm performance are 
compared between CC firms and non-CC firms using Wilcoxon test. Zero denotes no 
significant difference. 
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
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Table 3. Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants, industry and 
year controls, and board and ownership structure variables 
  Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: firm performance is measured by lagged ROA 
ROA-1  + .31(0.73) .49(0.69) .49(0.79) 
ROA-1 square   -.76(1.98)  
boardind  - 1.81***(0.17) 1.83***(0.16) -.12(0.20) 
Ln(boardsize)  + .14(0.09) .14(0.09) .01(0.18) 
Boardmeeting  ?                -.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) .01(0.01) 
Ln(sales)  +   .24***(0.03) 
stdret  +   1.55**(0.54) 
state  -   -.10(0.06) 
H5  ?  -.75***(0.20) 
LEV  ?   -.01(0.01) 
lagnegp  -   .13+(0.07) 
opportunityg  +   .03***(0.01) 
ROA-1*boardind  + 4.43+(2.43) 3.91(2.43) 5.50*(2.48) 
Industry fixed 
effects 
 No No Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
 No No Yes 
N  1398 1398 1398 
R2(%)  27 35 42 
Chi squares  357.45 524.86 831.58 
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Panel B: firm performance is measured by lagged RET 
RET-1  + -.02(0.08) .04(0.08) -.05(0.07) 
RET-1 square   -.08(0.06)  
boardind  - 1.85***(0.10) 1.82***(0.10) .16(0.15) 
Ln(boardsize)  + .13(0.08) .13(0.08) .02(0.08) 
boardmeeting ?               -.00(0.01) -.00(0.01) .01(0.01) 
Ln(sales)  +   .25***(0.03) 
stdret  +   1.11*(0.54) 
state  -   -.09(0.06) 
H5  ?  -.76***(.20) 
LEV  ?   -.01(0.01) 
lagnegprofit  -   -.06(0.05) 
opportunityg  +   .04***(0.01) 
RET-1*boardind  + .87**(0.34) .86*(0.34) .19(0.31) 
Industry fixed 
effects 
 No No Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
 No No Yes 
N  1448 1448 1448 
R2(%)  28 28 41 
Chi squares  107386.57 107099.16 145515.05 
* The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses  
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
The coefficients for the year and industry indicator variables are not reported in the tables 
because they are not of direct interest for this study. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 4 Results of CEO pay-performance regressions for subsamples 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Variable Top quartile of 
roa 
Bottom quartile of 
roa 
Large board Small board Board 
independence
>30% 
Board 
independence<=
30% 
ROA-1 -2.43**(0.95) 4.87**(1.87) -1.70
+(0.97) .58(1.18) 4.85+(2.62) -1.22(0.70) 
boardind -.79(0.57) .27(0.30) -.30(0.58) -.37(0.27) .08(0.68) -.50+(0.30) 
Ln(boardsize) -.28(0.18) -.12(0.14) -.16(0.32) -.02(0.14) .17(0.15) -.11(0.12) 
Boardmeeting  -.01(0.01) .00(0.01) .01(0.02) .01(0.01) .01(0.01) -.00(0.01) 
Ln(sales) .25***(0.05) .21***(0.04) .27***(0.06) .22***(0.03) .21***(0.03) .30***(0.03) 
stdret 1.92
+(1.12) -.22(0.95) -.18(1.34) 1.61*(0.69) .98(0.69) 1.13(0.79) 
state -.02(0.10) -.21
+(0.12) .01(0.12) -.02(0.07) .04(0.07) -.14+(0.08) 
H5 -.85**(0.29) -.37(0.30) -1.00*(0.42) -.87***(0.24) -.52*(0.24) -.90***(0.23) 
LEV .07(0.05) .01(0.02) -.01(0.09) .00(0.01) .00(0.01) -.04(0.03) 
opportunityg .06***(0.01) .05*(0.02) .02(0.02) .04***(0.01) .02(0.01) .05***(0.01) 
ROA-1*boardind 13.39**(4.72) -12.35*(6.12) 16.77*(6.72) 7.30*(3.30) -6.23(6.54) 13.50***(3.40) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 350 349 238 847 695 703 
R2(%) 57 42 50 42 32 35 
Chi squares 349.00 200.29 458.93 539.74 304.93 346.05 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Variables are as defined in table 1.   ***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 5 Results of compensation committees and CEO pay-performance regressions  
Panel A: firm performance is measured by lagged ROA 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Variable Full sample CC firms CC 
independence>60%
CC independence<=60% 
ROA-1 1.85***(0.47) 1.29(1.43) 20.52**(7.54) -1.19(1.68) 
CC .21***(0.05)    
Ccind(%)  .00(0.00) .03+(0.02) -.01(0.01) 
ROA-1*CC -.91(0.77)    
ROA-1*Ccind  .03(0.03) -.26*(0.10) .08*(0.04) 
Ln(comsize)  -.24+(0.03) -.13(0.38) -.10(0.29) 
Paiddirector  .23**(0.09) .21+(0.11) .38*(0.18) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1398 391 239 152 
R2(%) 43 38 32 50 
Chi squares 842.73 196.14 165.74 239.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
Panel B: firm performance is measured by lagged RET 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Variable Full sample CC firms CC 
independence>6
0% 
CC 
independence<=60% 
RET-1 .00(0.05) .02(0.29) 1.18*(0.52) -.49(0.41) 
CC .18***(0.04)    
Ccind(%)  .00(0.00) .02+(0.00) -.00(0.01) 
RET-1*CC -.15(0.12)    
RET-1*Ccind  -.00(0.00) -.02**(0.01) .00(0.01) 
Ln(comsize)  -.23(0.14) -.06(0.37) -.11(0.29) 
Paiddirector  .22*(0.09) .18(0.52) .42*(0.19) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1448 392 240 152 
R2(%) 42 36 32 48 
Chi squares 143932.13 203.18 197.63 179.31 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 6 Regression results of CEO pay-performance for firms with or without CC 
Panel A: firm performance is measured by lagged ROA 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Independent variables All firms 
N=1398 
CC firms 
N= 503 
Non-CC firms 
N= 895 
ROA-1 .40(0.80) -2.24***(0.70) 1.31+(0.71) 
boardind -.14(0.20) -.47(0.33) .06(0.23) 
ROA-1*boardind 5.56*(2.50) 13.39***(2.72) 1.58(2.37) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1398 503 895 
R2(%) 42 39 36 
Chi squares 856.97 283.07 455.15 
Panel B: firm performance is measured by lagged RET 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Independent variables All firms 
N=1448 
CC firms 
N=504 
Non-CC firms 
N=944 
RET-1 -.08(0.07) -.58**(0.19) .00(0.08) 
boardind .15(0.15) .06(0.30) .17(0.19) 
RET-1*boardind .33(0.30) 1.26+(0.67) .20(0.34) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1448 504 944 
R2(%) 41 37 35 
Chi squares 147055.45 253.05 461.29 
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are 
not of direct interest for this study. Variables are as defined in table 1. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 7 Relationship between board independence and executive pay-performance before 
and after compensation committee formation 
Test period 
Model: 
uROABoardind
BoardindROAceocom
++
++=
−
−
13
211
*
)ln(
β
ββα
 
Number of 
observations 
1β  3β  Adjusted R 
square 
F-test  
Panel A: Regression of the nature log of executive compensation on ROA-1 and boardind 
All periods 1398 .95*(0.44) 5.16***(1.20) 0.31 32.83 
Period before 266 -.38(0.89) 1.52(1.49) 0.30 6.77 
Periods after 503 .40(0.71) 5.33**(1.74) 0.23 8.45 
 
Model: 
uPostROABoardind
PostROAROABoardind
BoardindROAceocom
++
++
++=
−
−−
−
**
**
)ln(
15
1413
211
β
ββ
ββα
 
 Number of 
observations 
1β  3β  4β  5β  Adju
stedR 
squar
e 
F-test 
Panel B: Regression of the nature log of executive compensation on ROA-1 and boardind and an 
indicator variable denoting periods after compensation committee formation 
Before versus after 769 .99(0.72) 3.95*(1.58) -2.34+(1.20) 6.49+(3.51) 0.31 16.10 
Standard errors are in parentheses because the ρ  value of White (1980) test is greater 
than 0.05, suggesting the models we used have little Heteroskedasticity issues.  
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are 
not of direct interest for this study. 
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 8 Regression results of CEO pay-performance for firms with or without CC over 
2005-2007 
Firm performance is measured by lagged ROA 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Independent variables All firms CC firm Non-CC firms 
ROA-1 .91(0.86) 0.28(0.85) 2.91+(1.04) 
boardind 0.09(0.24) 0.03(0.27) .29(0.50) 
ROA-1*boardind -2.09(2.52) -1.00(2.58) -6.35*(3.05) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1467 990 477 
R2(%) 34 36 34 
Chi squares 666.39 504.14 232.02 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
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Table 9 Results of CEO pay-performance regressions for CC subsamples during 2005-
2007 
 Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation) 
Variable Top quartile of roa Bottom quartile of roa 
ROA-1 8.86 *(3.34) -3.93(2.84) 
CCIND .01 *(0.01) .01
+(0.00) 
Ln(boardsize) .09(0.18) .27(0.20) 
Boardmeeting  .01(0.01) .01
+(0.01) 
Ln(sales) .21***(0.06) .23***(0.05) 
stdret -.16(0.41) .83 (0.55) 
state .04 (0.11) .04 (0.11) 
H5 -.49 (0.38) -.43(0.44) 
LEV .05(0.03) -.01 (0.02) 
opportunityg .04 +(0.02) .00 (0.02) 
ROA-1*CCIND -.13*(0.05) .03 (.04) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 221 202 
R2(%) 58 32 
Chi squares 192.35 94.24 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Variables are as defined in table 1. 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
